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Abstract 
Little academic attention has been given to the study of Northern Irish Euroscepticism 
despite the fact that it is a unique and interesting example of citizens’ relationships with 
the EU. Northern Irish Euroscepticism is defined by the divergence in attitudes towards 
European integration between Catholics and Protestants. This is a divide that is rooted in 
historical and religious interpretations of the project, as well as the widespread belief that 
membership of the EU will somehow lead to a united Ireland. Membership in the EU has 
not had a significant political impact on Northern Ireland, with citizens’ attitudes being 
largely characterised by a clear lack of interest in the project. Participation at the European 
level provided limited opportunity for cooperation by both sides while it may be argued 
that European elections contributed to the sectarian divide.  
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Despite the Euroscepticism1 of Northern Ireland’s political representatives in the 
European Parliament, little academic research has been undertaken into examining 
attitudes towards the European Union (EU) in this corner of the United Kingdom. There are 
several reasons for this. The concentrated academic study of British Euroscepticism, 
particularly over recent years, is certainly warranted by the real possibility of an imminent 
British exit (Brexit) from the EU given the shock election of a majority Conservative 
government and the subsequent announcement that a referendum would be held before 
the end of 2017. However, the Northern Irish weight of the vote in such a referendum is so 
insignificant that for those who wish to arrest the rise of Euroscepticism in the UK by 
firstly understanding the causes of it, studying the particular case of Northern Ireland is 
not worth the effort.  
There is then the more significant obstacle of what many outsiders consider to be 
the baffling nature of Northern Irish politics. Pro-Europeans often attack the English 
Eurosceptic class as being “little Englanders”, delusional remnants of the British 
imperialist mind-set. Nonetheless, from an academic point of view, the thinking of the 
“little Englander” is much more accessible than any analysis into what governs attitudes 
towards the EU in Northern Ireland, a region where thinking in many ways appears not to 
have moved on from the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The 
protests and accompanying violence that took place in Northern Ireland during 2013 over 
the decision to fly the union flag over Belfast City Hall only on designated days may be 
bewildering to many outsiders, but it is nonetheless indicative of the unique mentalities 
which propel Northern Irish politics, and which consequently are at the roots of Northern 
Irish beliefs and opinions about the EU and European integration.  
In Harmsen and Spiering’s analysis of the various manifestations of 
Euroscepticism throughout the EU, Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and 
European Integration, Spiering limits his investigation into the Northern Irish case to a brief 
footnote in the British section: “Due to the special situation there, this article does not 
1 This thesis will use the definition of Euroscepticism given by Taggart; “an encompassing term” 
which “expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright 
and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration.” The thesis shall also draw on 
the distinction defined by Taggart and Szczerbiak between “hard” Euroscepticism (a principled 
opposition to EU membership) and “soft” Euroscepticism (an opposition to particular policies or 
supranational control over particular areas). P. Taggart and A. Szczerbiak. The Party Politics of 
Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States. Opposing Europe Research Network Working 
Paper 6. Brighton: Sussex European Institute, 2002. 
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investigate Euroscepticism in this part of the United Kingdom”.2 Likewise, major studies 
into the impact of Europeanization on national political parties such as those of Ladrech3 
and Mair4 have ignored Northern Irish parties. Even analyses into “ethnoregional” parties 
such as that of De Winter and Gómez-Reino examine UK regional parties such as Plaid 
Cymru and the Scottish National Party, but ignore the Northern Irish parties,5 while none of 
the recent major surveys conducted into the possibility of a Brexit have included a sample 
from Northern Ireland, with most making it clear that Northern Ireland has not been 
included.6  
However, the Northern Irish case is neither irrelevant nor should it be ignored. As a 
British referendum on EU membership approaches, Northern Ireland finds itself in a 
particularly precarious position. The consequences of a Brexit are magnified in the case of 
Northern Ireland, which is in a unique position not only because of its particular 
recognition under the EU funding model but more crucially through the fact that it is the 
only part of the UK which shares a land border with another EU member state. Similarly, an 
issue which as of yet appears not to have registered in the British debate on leaving the EU 
is the impact that this would have on a Northern Irish society, whose latent tensions have 
far from disappeared despite the outward appearance of a nation at peace with itself. Of 
course, it is a worst-case scenario that a British exit from the EU could provoke a return of 
the type of violence which killed over 3,000 people in 25 years. Nonetheless, a decision to 
leave the EU would have a significant impact on Northern Ireland. 
This paper will investigate the factors driving Northern Irish attitudes towards the 
EU. Firstly, the paper will analyse the reasons behind the religious divide present in 
Northern Ireland regarding attitudes towards the EU. The paper will then examine the 
impact membership of the EU has had on the attitudes of Northern Irish politicians and 
citizens.  
2 M. Spiering, ‘British Euroscepticism,’ in R. Harmsen and M. Spiering (eds.), Euroscepticism: Party 
Politics, National Identity and European Integration, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 2004, p. 131. 
3 R. Ladrech, ‘Europeanization and political parties: towards a framework for analysis,’ Party Politics, 
8(4), 2002, pp. 389-403. 
4 P. Mair, ‘The limited impact of Europe on national party systems,’ West European Politics, 23(4), 
2000, pp. 27-51. 
5 L. De Winter and M. Gómez-Reino, ‘European integration and ethnoregionalist parties’, Party 
Politics, 8(4), 2002, pp. 483-503. 
6 D. Phinnemore, Jean Monnet Chair in European Studies, Queens University Belfast, written 
correspondence, 31 April 2015. 
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This paper will use party manifestos, newspaper reports, interviews, election data 
and survey results as well as the academic literature on the subject to establish the 
dominant factors in the Northern Irish relationship with the EU.  
 
1. Religion as a factor in attitudes towards the European Union 
The Northern Irish conflict is highly complex, and this paper does not intend to 
analyse the causes of it and the issues at stake. However, for the sake of clarity, the terms 
Catholic and Protestant which will be used throughout the paper, at times interchangeably 
with nationalist and unionist, must be explained. This is not to see the conflict in Northern 
Ireland as a religious conflict, but merely to view religion as an identifier for the two 
communities.7 As Mitchell explains, “the central argument is that religion is an ethnic 
marker, but that it is not generally politically relevant in and of itself. Instead, 
ethnonationalism lies at the root of the conflict.”8 This is a conception of the conflict 
which appears to represent an academic consensus.9 McGarry and O’Leary in Explaining 
Northern Ireland argue that “there is nothing innate about religious or cultural differences 
which makes people disagree, rather, that these are just signs which could be substituted 
with anything else, and which exist simply to distinguish group members from non-group 
members.” Additionally, they point out that “whilst there was a clear decline of church 
attendance and traditional morality since the 1960s, conflict escalated” and that “there is 
no correlation between the areas most affected by conflict and the intensity of religious 
convictions.” 10 
Historically, Irish Catholics have generally sought independence from the United 
Kingdom while Irish Protestants have sought to maintain British sovereignty. Above all, 
group solidarity exists within each of the two communities. This paper will firstly analyse 
the reasons behind the religious divide present in Northern Ireland regarding attitudes 
towards the EU.  
7 This paper will make frequent references to “the two communities”; Catholics and Protestants. 
8 C. Mitchell, Religion, identity and politics in Northern Ireland – boundaries of belonging and belief, 
Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006, p. 5. 
9 Ibid. 
10 J. McGarry and B. O’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland, Oxford, Blackwell, 1995, p. 5. 
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Catholics in favour, Protestants opposed 
Even before the British accession to the EEC in 1973, there was a clear cleavage 
between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland over support for membership. An 
opinion poll carried out in 1967 found that, when the “don’t knows” were removed, 80 per 
cent of Catholics were in favour of joining the “European common market”, while 
protestants were marginally opposed.11 This is a pattern that would be repeated in the 
1975 referendum on British membership of the EEC12 while in 1992 a survey carried out by 
the BBC found that Northern Irish Catholics were overwhelmingly in favour of the UK 
remaining in the EU (a majority of six to one), while significantly fewer protestants (two to 
one) were in favour.13 The most recent survey was carried out in 2002 and identified the 
two communities as nationalist and unionist rather than Catholic and Protestant; however, 
the same pattern was evident with 36 per cent of unionists responding that the UK should 
either leave the EU or reduce its powers compared to only 16 per cent of nationalists. 
Similarly, the nationalist community was twice as likely to be federalists, with 13 per cent 
of nationalists believing in a single EU government compared to only 6 per cent of 
unionists. Issues such as the single European currency saw an even greater divide with 60 
per cent of nationalists in favour of a British adoption of the euro compared to only 20 per 
cent of unionists.14 
Although there have been numerous analyses of what causes support for European 
integration, as Eichenberg and Dalton explain, “The dominant theme of the literature is 
now the primacy of economic and utilitarian concerns”.15 Nonetheless, throughout Europe 
there is evidence of some relationship between religion and support for European 
integration. This relationship has been the focus of several studies. The next section will 
analyse attempts, led by Nelsen and Guth, to explain differences in attitudes towards 
European integration on religious grounds and assess their relevance for Northern Ireland.   
11 D. Kennedy, ‘The European Union and the Northern Ireland question’, in B. Barton and P. Roche 
(eds.), The Northern Ireland Question: Perspectives and Policies, Aldershot, Avebury, 1994, p. 166. 
12 D. Phinnemore, L. McGowan, C. McCall and P. McLoughlin, Northern Ireland – 40 years of EU 
membership – European Parliament Report, p. 1. 
13 D. Kennedy, ‘The European Union and the Northern Ireland question’, op. cit., pp. 166-167. 
14 L. McGowan and S. O’Connor, ‘Eurovision: Attitudes towards the European Union’, 2003, in Ark 
Research update. (19 ed.). ARK, retrieved on 2nd May 2015, http://pure.qub.ac.uk/portal/files/ 
10784035/Euro_Vision.pdf 
15 R. Eichenberg and R. Dalton, ‘Convergence and Divergence in Citizen Support for European 
Integration, 1973-1996’, paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, 28-31 Aug. 1997, Washington, DC, p. 6.  
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A pan-European religious interpretation of the European Union 
In their investigation into religious attitudes towards the EU, Nelsen and Guth 
observe that throughout the EU “Catholics are most supportive of integration efforts, 
orthodox believers slightly less so, and Protestants lag significantly behind.” 16 
Consequently, Nelsen and Guth argue that the economic explanations for support for 
European integration put forward by Milward and Moravcsik only go so far towards 
explaining the hesitance of Britain and the Lutheran Nordic countries towards the 
European project. Instead, they assert that the religious experience of EU member states 
remains central in forming their differing approaches to integration.17 They argue, in 
Religion and the Struggle for European Union, that pro-Europeanism among Catholics is 
driven by the universality of the Catholic Church which sought the unity of Christendom.18 
Protestant attachment to the nation state stems from the sixteenth century and “the 
struggles between Roman spiritual and political hegemony” which “fostered the 
Reformation’s reliance on the nation state, created a distrust of international Catholicism 
and encouraged a link in the Protestant mind between national sovereignty and true 
religion.”19 This historical memory was central to Protestant resistance to the dominantly 
Catholic (particularly in the early years) EU as a reassertion of Catholic hegemony.20  
European integration – a Catholic project 
The literature examining religious attitudes in Northern Ireland, as well as the 
approaches taken by political leaders, in particular unionists, concurs to a large extent 
with the theory of Guth and Nelsen. Richard Rose, in his 1971 book Governing Without 
Consensus, identifies the predominance in Northern Ireland of the belief that the European 
project was largely a Catholic project. A preponderance of Catholicism among the 
16 J. Guth and B. Nelsen, ‘Religion and Attitudes toward the European Union: The New Member 
States’, European Union Studies Association Ninth Biennial International Conference, Hyatt 
Regency Austin, Austin, Texas, 31st March – 2nd April 2005, p. 3. 
17 B. Nelsen, J. Guth and B. Highsmith, ‘Does Religion Still Matter? Religion and Public Attitudes 
Toward Integration in Europe,’ Religion and Politics Section of the American Political Science 
Association, 2010, p. 3.  
18 J. Guth and B. Nelsen, Religion and the Struggle for European Union, Georgetown, Georgetown 
University Press, 2015. 
19 B. Nelsen, J. Guth and R. Fraser, “Does Religion matter? Christianity and Public Support for the 
European Union,” European Union Politics, Volume 2(2), 2001, p. 194. 
20 J. Guth and B. Nelsen, ‘Religion and Attitudes toward the European Union: The New Member 
States’, loc. cit. 
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founding member states, with four of the six nations signing the Treaty of Rome being 
overwhelmingly Catholic,21 as well as the fact that calls for unification had been led by 
devout Catholics such as Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman and Alcide de Gasperi,22 was 
considered by many Northern Irish Protestants to be a sufficient reason to steer clear of 
any sort of integration.23 The dominant role in integration played by Catholics is a trend 
that has hardly disappeared: in more recent years staunchly Catholic politicians such as 
former Commission President Romano Prodi, Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Guterres 
and the former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl have all been strong proponents of 
European integration.24  
Although Dinan identifies the connection between Catholicism and European 
integration during the initial stages of European integration,25 something that would later 
be disputed by Milward26 among others, there does not appear to be a clear link between 
the religious beliefs of later politicians and their attitudes towards European integration. 
However, the central role played by religion in Northern Irish politics, where a politician’s 
religious identity plays a far more dominant role than any other element of his or her 
political persuasion, means that the Northern Irish public may have found it difficult to 
divorce a European politician’s religious identity from his or her political beliefs. Of course, 
it is unlikely that every Northern Irish citizen, or even a significant number of them, knew 
what religion Romano Prodi was and had independently formed a connection between his 
religion and his views on European integration. However, as this paper will demonstrate, 
this would not be necessary for such ideas to become widespread. Such was the 
indifference towards the EU in Northern Ireland that all it required was for prominent 
politicians to make these connections for these ideas to be diffused. 
21 R. Rose, Governing without Consensus, London, Faber and Faber, 1971, p. 489. 
22 B. Nelsen, J. Guth and C. Fraser, ‘Does Religion Matter? Christianity and Public Support for the 
European Union’, European Union Politics, 2(2001), p. 193. 
23 D. Kennedy, ‘The European Union and the Northern Ireland question’, op. cit., p. 167. 
24 Nelsen et al., loc. cit. 
25 D. Dinan, ‘The Historiography of European Integration’, in D. Dinan (ed.), Origins and Evolution of 
the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 297-324. 
26 A. Milward, ‘History and Theory’, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, London, Routledge, 
1992, pp. 1-20. 
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Northern Irish Protestants – a particular case 
As has been mentioned, Northern Irish Protestants are not the only group which 
appears to subscribe to such a large extent to religion-based theories of European 
integration; sections of Norwegian revivalists,27 Dutch Calvinist sectarians28 and Swedish 
evangelicals29 hold similar views. However, there is no other member state in which such 
ideas could be said to have permeated the political mainstream to the extent that they 
have in Northern Ireland. Of course, being Protestant does not necessarily mean having an 
ingrained aversion to the idea of European integration. As Davie points out, there is 
significant variation between European Protestants in their attitudes towards European 
integration,30 while Philpott and Shaw give the example of Protestant communities in 
Germany and the Netherlands that have been easily won over to the idea.31 However, the 
role of religion in Irish history and Northern Irish Protestants’ historic attachment to their 
identity make the Northern Irish case particular.  
Additionally, the role of Ian Paisley (leader of the largest political party in Northern 
Ireland, the Democratic Unionist Party) in the propagation of a religious interpretation of 
the EU should not be underestimated. Paisley, whose religion was so central to his 
political beliefs that his Church described him as God’s “specially anointed” leader while 
his wife compared him to Moses,32 used his significant rhetorical skills as a constant and 
loud reminder of protestant opposition towards the EU, instilling among many protestants 
who might otherwise have been open to the idea of European integration a conception of 
the European project as a religious construction; this may take long to fade. 
27 J. Madeley, “The Antinomies of Lutheran Politics: The Case of Norway’s Christian People’s Party”, 
in D. Hanley (ed.), Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective, London, Pinter, 1994, p. 
151.  
28 P. Lucardie, ‘Conservatism in the Netherlands: Fragments and Fringe Groups’, in B. Girvin (ed.), 
The Transformation of Contemporary Conservatism, London, Sage, 1998. 
29 M. Hagevi, ‘Religiosity and Opinion on the European Union among Individuals in Sweden’, paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (19-22 Oct. 
2000), Houston, Texas. 
30 G. Davie, Religion in Britain since 1945, Sussex, Blackwell, 1994, 1st edn., pp. 106-108. 
31 D. Philpott and T. Shaw, ‘Faith, Freedom and Federation: The Role of Religious Ideas and 
Institutions in European Political Convergence,’ in T. Byrnes and P. Katzenstein (eds.) Religion in an 
Expanding Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 34-64. 
32 E. Moloney, Paisley: From Demagogue to Democrat?, Dublin, Poolbeg, 2008, pp. 502-503. 
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United Ireland in a united Europe?      
The opposition of Northern Irish Protestants to Irish independence has played a 
central role in the history of the region since the Plantation of Ulster, the mass 
colonisation of the province beginning in the seventeenth century by Scottish and English 
Protestants. Since the creation of Northern Ireland in 1921, followed by the independence 
of the southern part of Ireland in 1922, Northern Irish politics have been dominated by the 
question of Irish unity. More specifically, a Protestant majority has sought to avoid at all 
costs the reunification of Ireland. Northern Irish Protestant opposition to Irish 
independence has been more than a blind allegiance to British sovereignty. The slogan of 
Irish protestant opposition, originally used during the late nineteenth century, that “Home 
Rule is Rome Rule”, expressed the fear that an independent Irish state would be some sort 
of satellite state of the Vatican and would result in the end of the religious and civil 
liberties enjoyed by Protestants. Certainly, the dominant role played by the Catholic Church 
during the first decades of Irish independence makes it is hard to refute this claim entirely.  
Catholics, on the other hand, have traditionally been in favour of Irish independence. 
Having historically represented the religious underclass, discriminated against by law, they 
viewed independence as a righteous cause. However, what is the link between the struggle 
for Irish independence and membership of the EU?  
Rose identifies “the belief among Protestants and Catholics that the lowering of 
national barriers between the United Kingdom and the common market countries would 
inevitably be followed by moves to unify Ireland.”33 These were by no means vague 
theories, with prominent nationalists openly discussing the benefits that membership of 
the European Economic Community would give to their cause during the early years of 
European integration. Indeed, Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Seán Lemass had justified 
Ireland’s application to join the EEC in 1961 by arguing that it would be a means to 
reunification. Others pointed out that economic arguments for partition put forward by 
many Protestants, namely a dependence on trade with the rest of the UK, would no longer 
remain valid, as within the EEC Northern Ireland would still have access to the British 
market even if it left the UK. 34 Dennis Kennedy highlights the irony of a European project 
initiated in an attempt to eliminate nationalism throughout Europe becoming seen as the 
33 Rose, loc. cit. 
34 G. Fitzgerald, Towards a New Ireland, London, 1972, pp. 102-113. 
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vehicle for Irish nationalism to achieve its objectives.35 Nonetheless, the threat appeared 
to be real; any reduction in national sovereignty that would arise through EEC membership 
would consequently be a reduction in British sovereignty over Northern Ireland, the single 
most important issue for the two major unionist parties as well as a large proportion of 
Northern Irish protestants. Kennedy outlines how these fears were compounded by 
perception throughout the EU “that Irish unity is morally right and progressive in the same 
way that many people regard European integration as a “good thing””.36 
The Irish position – a factor for Catholics?  
It seems likely that many Northern Irish Catholics who view the future of Northern 
Ireland as being part of a united Ireland are influenced by the strong pro-European current 
in Irish politics, as well as the success story that many consider Irish membership of the 
EU to be. Ireland’s swift economic recovery has won praise from European leaders, with 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel describing Ireland as the “growth engine of Europe” in 
April 2015.37 The Irish position has become increasingly important recently as a potential 
British exit of the EU approaches with pro-European Irish voices using the media to 
express their opposition to a Brexit including Taoiseach Enda Kenny who has said a Brexit 
would have “very serious consequences for Northern Ireland.”38 
A physical border? 
In the case of a Brexit, given the public concern over immigration, it would appear 
that any acceptable outcome of a renegotiation of Britain’s relationship with the EU would 
have to permit the UK to have control over its borders. Consequently, the border between 
Northern and Southern Ireland would become an external border of the EU. Given that the 
Republic of Ireland would still be subject to EU freedom of movement rules, nothing less 
than a physical border would ensure that the UK remained in control of the number of EU 
immigrants entering. Although the question of a potential border between the North and 
South of Ireland has received little media attention, it is an issue which would have 
dramatic consequences for the region. A physical border would open up all sorts of 
35 D. Kennedy, ‘The European Union and the Northern Ireland question’, loc. cit. 
36 Ibid., p. 169. 
37 Bloomberg, ‘Merkel calls Ireland “growth engine” of EU’, The Irish Times, 22 April 2015. 
38 M. Devenport, “Scottish and EU referendums: The effect on Northern Ireland”, BBC News, 6 
February 2014. 
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questions about how the nationalist community would react given Northern Ireland’s 
fragile state of peace; Mark Leonard, Director of the European Council on Foreign 
Relations, describes how it could reignite the Troubles.39 It is a time-bomb that has been 
recognised by the Irish government, which recently established a new unit within the 
Department of the Taoiseach to prepare for a potential British exit of the EU.40 The 
reluctance of Northern Irish politicians to tackle these issues is noteworthy, and is 
perhaps indicative of the fact that Northern Irish politics is not governed by the 
progressive nature of new challenges, but remains rooted in historic hostilities where 
votes have traditionally been won by whichever party proves to be the best guarantor of 
interests for a specific community. 
 
2. The impact of the European Union on Northern Ireland 
Any study into Northern Irish attitudes towards the EU must address the question of 
what effect membership has had on the province, both from the point of view of domestic 
politics as well as for citizens. Most Europeans feel that EU membership has altered their 
country in some way, yet in Northern Ireland the dominance of domestic political issues 
has often drowned out potential debate over the EU’s impact on the region. This section 
will examine Northern Irish politicians’ apparent willingness to work together at the 
European level, the impact of European elections on Northern Ireland, John Hume’s 
attempts to involve the EU in the Northern Irish peace process as well as the financial 
support received by Northern Ireland from the EU. The section will finish by assessing the 
approach of the media in Northern Ireland to the European question.  
An opportunity for cooperation? 
Compared to the dysfunctional relationship between the various parties which often 
seems to characterise Northern Irish politics, Laffan41 and Meehan42 point out that at the 
39 J. Harris, ‘This way to the Brexit: what would happen if Britain left the EU?’, The Guardian, 10th 
October 2014. 
40 F. Kelly, ‘Kenny’s department to prepare for possible UK exit from EU’, The Irish Times, 13th March 
2015. 
41 B. Laffan, ‘The European context: a new political dimension in Ireland, Northern and South,’ in J. 
Coakley, B. Laffan and J. Todd (eds.), Renovation or Revolution? New Territorial Politics in Ireland and 
the United Kingdom, Dublin, UCD Press, 2005, pp. 166-184. 
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European level the three Northern Irish MEPs have generally been able to cooperate on 
matters related to Northern Ireland, such as agriculture, fisheries and structural funds. 
Perhaps their greatest success was the lobbying efforts of Hume, Paisley and Taylor 
during the 1990s that resulted in the establishment of the EU’s Special Programme for 
Peace and Reconciliation (PEACE funding).43 According to Julian Priestley, Secretary-
General of the European Parliament between 1997 and 2007, Paisley (who based his 
political persona in Northern Ireland around the word “No”, refusing to cooperate in any 
way with nationalist politicians) behaved in a much more accommodating manner in 
Brussels. He was willing to work with both nationalist Northern Irish politicians as well as 
MEPs from the Republic of Ireland. It was the impression in the European Parliament that 
the Northern Irish MEPs, far from the glare of the domestic media, used the European level 
for “off-the-radar” discussions over the situation in Northern Ireland. 44 
Was this, however, indicative of a shift in Northern Irish politics or simply an 
aberration from the tradition of bitter hostility? A more likely explanation for the 
cooperation of the Northern Irish MEPs in the European Parliament was firstly the 
necessity to do so in order to gain funding for Northern Ireland and secondly the absence 
of media scrutiny into their actions in the European Parliament. It should be remembered 
that the two major political parties currently predominant in Northern Ireland rose to 
prominence on the basis of a policy of no compromise; the DUP by refusing to share 
power with nationalists, and Sinn Féin as the political wing of the IRA. Willingness to 
compromise may have been seen in Northern Ireland as a sign of weakness rather than 
being a political necessity. 
European elections as a distraction from tribal politics? 
Cooperation between the three MEPs at the European level may have represented a 
break from the historic inability of politicians from the two communities to work together, 
but European elections have brought about little change in the attitudes of Northern Irish 
42 E. Meehan, ‘Europe and the Europeanization of the Irish question,’ in M. Cox, A. Guelke and F. 
Stephen (eds.), A Farewell to Arms? From ‘Long War’ to ‘Long Peace’ in Northern Ireland, Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 2000, pp. 199-213. 
43 Laffan, ‘The European context: a new political dimension in Ireland, North and South,’ op. cit., p. 
175. 
44 J. Priestley, Former Secretary-General of the European Parliament, interview, Bruges, 17th March 
2015. 
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voters with no evidence of European issues having had any effect on voter preference. The 
occurrence of another election every five years in Northern Ireland which, like Westminster 
elections, has turned out to be nothing more than a “tribal head-counting competition”45 
has done little to reduce traditional Northern Irish hostilities. According to Phinnemore et 
al., “EP elections have generally only added to the polarisation within society between the 
two predominant communities.”46  
The European elections offered not only another opportunity for confrontation 
between the major political parties but a chance for publicity outside of the province. For 
Kennedy, this was an unfortunate consequence of direct elections to the European 
Parliament: “the decision by the British government to make Northern Ireland one three-
seat constituency, with the single transferable vote PR system, opened the way for the 
first Euro-election to become a presidential-type contest between the province’s political 
heavyweights.” Kennedy goes on to argue that “Paisley’s ability to top the poll in 
successive European elections has helped give him a personal status well above any that 
his party’s performances in national or local elections [until the DUP’s breakthrough in 
national elections] would have merited.”47 The amplification of Northern Irish sectarian 
issues to the European level has done little to increase the chances that Northern Ireland 
might somehow escape from the tribalism that had for so longer dominated its politics. 
Hume – the European thorn in the backside of unionists 
John Hume’s popularity and influence with many MEPs drew cynicism and mistrust 
from the unionist community. Hume’s party, the SDLP, was a member of the European 
Confederations of Socialist Parties, the largest group in the EP. Hume was the groups’ 
treasurer and sat on the front benches. He appeared to use his influence to initiate a 
formal EC investigation into the situation in Northern Ireland, resulting in the 1984 
Haagerup Report, which in turn seemed to influence Margaret Thatcher’s decision to 
support the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. The report would find much opposition among 
the unionist hierarchy, many of whom were cynical about the fact that the report seemed 
to be in line with the SDLP’s solution to the Northern Irish conflict: power-sharing between 
nationalists and unionists and the involvement of the British and Irish governments to 
45 E. West, ‘Can Northern Ireland ever work? History suggests not’, The Daily Telegraph, 17 June 
2010. 
46 Phinnemore et al., op. cit., p. 2. 
47 D. Kennedy, ‘The European Union and the Northern Ireland question’, op. cit., p. 178. 
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reach a compromise. 48 The SDLP’s attempts to involve the EU in the Northern Irish 
situation would again infuriate unionists in 1992 when the SDLP submitted their Agreeing 
New Political Structures document to the Mayhew talks. The paper proposed that the EU 
play a central role in the governance of Northern Ireland, suggesting that a delegate from 
the Commission sit on a regional executive alongside representatives of the British and 
Irish governments as well as locally elected politicians, a plan which unionists immediately 
dismissed.49 Unionist politicians, many of whom saw it as their priority to resist stubbornly 
and aggressively any attempts to involve representation of the Republic of Ireland in the 
Northern Irish situation, were alarmed at the suggestion of the involvement of the 
European level, something that presumably contributed to the hostility much of the 
protestant community felt towards the EU.  
The European Union and the peace process 
The EEC would, however, provide a forum for the transformation of the relationship 
between two of the key players in the Northern Irish problem. Dennis Kennedy points out 
how the mutually distrustful relationship between the British and Irish governments began 
to improve during the initial decades of EEC membership through cooperation at the 
European level, in particular in the Council of Ministers, where “British ministers and 
diplomats could see their Irish counterparts as clever partners in Europe.” 50  EEC 
membership gave British and Irish representations a neutral space in which to reshape 
their relationship at a time when relations were highly tense over the Northern Irish 
situation.51 
There is evidence that the EU did have some influence on the transformation of the 
Northern Irish political scene. Phinnemore et al. argue that the Haagerup report influenced 
Thatcher’s decision to support the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, “which drew on EC-
inspired notions of transnational governance”. 52 The Good Friday Agreement, which 
instated Northern Ireland’s current devolved system of governance and was the basis on 
which the present period of relative peace in Northern Ireland, was established was signed 
48 Phinnemore et al., op. cit., p. 3. 
49 D. Kennedy, “Europe and the Northern Ireland problem”, in D. Kennedy (ed.), Living with the 
European Union: The Northern Ireland Experience, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, pp. 156-
158. 
50 D. Kennedy, ‘The European Union and the Northern Ireland question’, op. cit., p. 177. 
51 Phinnemore et al., loc. cit. 
52 Ibid. 
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in 1998. Many of the key actors in the peace process identified the influence of the EU (in 
particular the principles of the EU and its treaties) in the Good Friday Agreement.53  
Although the argument that EU membership has played a crucial role in achieving 
peace in Northern Ireland should be avoided, given that violence continued for two 
decades after Northern Ireland’s entry into the EEC, there is evidence that EU membership, 
despite in some ways fuelling distrust between the communities, has contributed to the 
Northern Irish peace process. 
European Union funding 
Any investigation into attitudes towards the EU in Northern Ireland must take into 
account the significant economic benefits EU membership has brought the region. 
Notwithstanding the economic benefits brought to the UK as a whole through membership 
of the single market, which Hugo Dixon claims has increased British GDP by approximately 
4-5 per cent,54 Northern Ireland has benefited from numerous specific funding schemes. 
As recently as February 2015, the adoption of the European Commission’s new cross-
border co-operation programme has made €283 million available for Northern Irish 
projects.55 The extended period over which Northern Ireland has received EU funding 
means that many volunteer groups are now dependent on this funding.56 
Northern Ireland has received €1.3 billion since 199557 as a result of the EU PEACE 
programmes58, while numerous other schemes have been created to attempt to aid the 
region to emerge from its difficult past. In May 2007 Commission President José Manuel 
Barroso set up a Task Force for Northern Ireland run by the Commission to maximise the 
opportunities on offer for the province.  
Northern Ireland has consistently been a major beneficiary of funds received through 
the CAP with Irish Taoiseach Enda Kenny stating in 2014 that “Ulster [ie. Northern Irish] 
farmers have been big winners from the Common Agricultural Policy”.59 For the period 
2014-2020 Northern Ireland will receive direct payments of €2.3 billion as well as €227 
53 Ibid. 
54 Dixon, op. cit., p. 116. 
55 BBC News, “Northern Ireland projects to tap into £208m worth of new European funding”, 23 
February 2015. 
56 Ibid. 
57 European Commission, Northern Ireland in Europe – Report of the European Commission’s 
Northern Ireland Task Force 2007-2014, Ronald Hall, Luxembourg, 2014, p. 25. 
58 Phinnemore et al., op. cit., p. 4. 
59 Devenport, loc. cit. 
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million through rural development. Although the regional allocation of the UK’s CAP 
allocation is agreed in Westminster, Northern Ireland consistently does relatively well 
compared to the other UK regions.60 Consequently, according to Kennedy, the farming 
community is largely pro-EU. However, this does not affect voting patterns within the 
farming community, either in Westminster or in European elections, where voting remains 
tribal, regardless of the benefits brought to the farming community through the CAP.61 
Under the EU’s cohesion policy, Northern Ireland was an Objective One Region for 
more than two decades (GDP is less than 75 per cent of the EU average), as one of the 
poorest regions of the EU. After the accession of many poorer countries in Eastern Europe 
Northern Ireland fell out of the category and is currently classified as a “transition region”. 
Cohesion policy has funded numerous major projects in Northern Ireland, including the 
“Peace Bridge” in Derry which united both sides of the River Foyle and received over €11 
million from the European Regional Development Fund.62  
Despite the large amount of funding Northern Ireland has received from the EU, an 
analysis into the effect that this has had on public opinion is difficult, with no evidence 
that the receipt of funds has led voters to reject tribal voting at European elections. More 
relevant, perhaps, is the question of funding for the two communities, where receipt of 
funds could certainly not be said to explain the divergence in attitudes towards EU 
membership. Nationalists may have a significantly higher level of support for the EU but it 
could not be argued that this is due to receiving a disproportionate benefit from EU 
funding. In April 2012 the Orange Order, the Protestant fraternal organisation, was granted 
almost £900,000 of EU funds63 while in October 2012 the organisation received a £3.6 
million grant from the PEACE programme.64 These are only two of several payments that 
the unionist organisation has received from the EU. 
60 European Commission, Northern Ireland in Europe – Report of the European Commission’s 
Northern Ireland Task Force 2007-2014, op. cit., p. 47. 
61 D. Kennedy, Irish Times Journalist, former Head of the European Commission office in Belfast, 
written correspondence, 30 March 2015. 
62 European Commission, Northern Ireland in Europe – Report of the European Commission’s 
Northern Ireland Task Force 2007-2014, op. cit., p. 26. 
63 M. McHugh, ‘Orange Order receives £900,000 EU grant’, The Belfast Telegraph, 17 April 2012. 
64 BBC News, ‘Orange Order to get £3.6 million grant from European Union peace programme’, 31 
October 2012. 
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The role of the media 
A central role in the detachment of the Northern Irish public from the EU is played by 
the media.65 Traditionally, the British media has been influential in Northern Ireland, in 
particular the London tabloids such as the Daily Mirror (which traditionally outsold both 
the Irish and other English dailies), the Sun, and the Express.66 The dominance of the 
British press goes a long way to explaining the lack of interest in the EU in Northern 
Ireland; three-quarters of British newspapers sold are Eurosceptic,67 while the remaining 
quarter, although they could be categorised as “pro-European”, are still often critical of the 
EU.68 
Historically, the Belfast Telegraph has been the only Northern Irish newspaper to 
have been able to compete with the English dailies; however, in recent years its circulation 
has fallen to less than 50,000 (from a peak of 200,000 in 1959). The Belfast Telegraph’s 
reporting of European issues is similar to that of Northern Irish radio and television; little 
coverage of the relevance of European issues and little debate on Northern Ireland’s 
position within Europe. A significant factor in Northern Irish indifference to the EU has 
been what Dennis Kennedy describes as “tabloid” radio; phone-ins with listeners able to 
express ill-informed opinions about the EU, with presenters who know little more directing 
proceedings.69 The scale of the media’s neglect of European level politics was revealed in 
2002, when a survey indicated that only 40 per cent of Northern Irish citizens had read or 
heard something about the EU over the preceding twelve months.70  
Although an analysis into the impact of the media on the religious divide in attitudes 
towards the EU is problematic, given that no studies have been carried out into the 
newspaper reading habits of the two communities, the low quality of media coverage on 
the EU can be seen as a reason why the religious divide is so evident, with few having the 
necessary information at their disposal to draw their own conclusions.  
65 D. Kennedy, Irish Times Journalist, former Head of the European Commission office in Belfast, 
written correspondence, 30 March 2015. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Charles Grant’s analysis of the British press influence on British attitudes towards the EU 
highlights the combination of highly tendentious reporting with the regular printing of falsehoods 
about the EU.  
68 C. Grant, ‘Why is Britain Eurosceptic’, Centre for European Reform, p. 3. Retrieved on 26 February 
2015, http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/essay_ 
eurosceptic_19dec08-1345.pdf  
69 Dennis Kennedy written correspondence 30tMarch 2015. 
70 L. McGowan and S. O’Connor, loc. cit.  
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Conclusion 
Significant divergences between the two communities in Northern Ireland 
regarding attitudes towards European integration have existed since before the British 
entry into the EEC. This division is not unique to Northern Ireland, even if it is significantly 
more pronounced than it is in other parts of Europe. Guth and Nelson’s analyses of a 
religious basis for the formation of attitudes towards European integration appears to 
conform with the situation in Northern Ireland, with Catholics throughout Europe being 
more in favour of integration than Protestants. However, the extent of the divergence of 
opinion between the two communities requires a more complex explanation; the belief 
that EU membership would ease the path toward Irish reunification would be the major 
factor in the development of different attitudes among the two communities. This fear was 
coupled with the idea that the EU was in some way “on the side” of Irish reunification. 
Although difficult to prove, it seems likely that Northern Irish Catholics are influenced by 
the tradition of pro-Europeanism in the Republic of Ireland, something that has become 
increasingly relevant recently as Irish politicians have spoken out in favour of the UK 
remaining in the EU. Importantly, the multitude of unanswered questions about what a 
Northern Ireland would look like post-Brexit as well as the potential stability of a future 
arrangement have largely been ignored by the Northern Irish political class. 
The Northern Irish MEPs’ willingness to cooperate in the European Parliament has 
been in stark contrast to the dysfunctional political situation in Northern Ireland. This 
cooperation was, however, neither based on an enthusiasm for the European project nor 
on the adoption of new perspectives on Northern Ireland but simply on its necessity in 
order to procure funding for Northern Ireland. The absence of any media scrutiny into the 
action of Northern Irish MEPs, primarily due to the indifference of the Northern Irish public, 
meant that it was politically possible for the unionist MEPs to cooperate in Brussels. 
European elections, instead of providing a relief from the domestic political situation, have 
further contributed to sectarian hostilities. The apparent influence of Hume and the SDLP 
in the European Parliament, and the consequent European Parliament investigations into 
Northern Ireland, did little to improve the unionist perception of the EU. Although there is 
some evidence that the EU played a role in the Northern Irish peace process, this role 
should not be exaggerated, given the fact that Northern Ireland was a member of the EU 
for two decades before any peace settlement was reached. Northern Ireland has benefited 
significantly from financial assistance from the EU. Importantly, EU financing cannot be 
 24 
considered to explain the sectarian divide in attitudes towards EU membership. Finally, the 
low quality of the Northern Irish media reflects the public’s indifference to, and 
disengagement from, the EU. 
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